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SURVEY SECTION
Criminal Law. Guido v. State, 746 A.2d 697 (R.I. 2000). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that their holding in
Doe' did not apply retroactively to the defendant in this case, but
simply put a halt to the unauthorized practice of police officers,
acting as agents for the grand jury, being used as investigatory
tools for police departments or the Office of the Attorney General. 2
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Defendant Salvatore Guido (Guido) was convicted of driving
under the influence with serious bodily injury resulting following
a near-fatal, head-on motor vehicle collision.3 Guido had been re-
turning home from a bachelor party where he had been seen drink-
ing, and rescue workers found an open, partially filled bottle of
beer on the front floor of Guido's car.4 Guido was taken by medical
helicopter to Rhode Island Hospital where blood samples were
drawn from him and tested for alcohol.5 Three days later, a police
officer, who was investigating the accident, appeared before a
grand jury and requested a subpoena to obtain hospital medical
records relating to Guido's blood-alcohol level. 8 He also asked to be
made an agent of the grand jury for return of service of the sub-
poena. 7 After receiving the documents, he turned them over to the
Office of the Attorney General, which used them to determine that
probable cause existed to charge Guido pursuant to criminal infor-
mation.8 Ultimately, Guido was convicted. 9
Guido appealed his conviction and the Rhode Island Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal.' 0 In that action, defendant had ap-
plied for post-conviction relief, which was denied." He again
appealed.
1. In re Doe, 717 A.2d 1129 (R.I. 1998).
2. See Guido v. State, 746 A.2d 697, 700 (R.I. 2000).
3. See id. at 698.
4. See State v. Guido, 698 A.2d 729, 732 (R.I. 1997).
5. See id.
6. See Guido, 746 A.2d at 698.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 698.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Guido filed his application for post-conviction relief in light of
a recent ruling in Doe.' 2 In Doe, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
took the opportunity to address the use of police officers as agents
of the grand jury.' 3 The court was concerned that police officers
receiving possibly privileged information could use this informa-
tion to prosecute misdemeanor crimes, or worse, that prosecutors
could use the grand jury to issue subpoenas to obtain evidence con-
cerning matters not before the grand jury.' 4 The court held that
the subpoena power of the grand jury is for the grand jury's own
use, not to further independent investigations of the prosecutor or
police. 15
Guido argued that Doe announced a new rule of law that al-
tered the fundamental way the grand jury had been operating.' 6
However, the court maintained that there had never been author-
ity for the practice of using grand juries as investigatory tools for
police departments or prosecutors.' 7 The court held that even if
Doe had announced a new rule of law, once a defendant's appeal
has been decided and a subsequent new rule announced, the defen-
dant is not entitled to retroactive application of the new rule except
where the new rule enhanced accuracy and ensured fundamental
fairness.' 8 The court held that this exception did not apply here. 19
Since the court had already considered Guido's appeal once
before, and Doe was distinguished from Guido's latest appeal, his
appeal was denied and the denial of his application for post-convic-
tion relief was affirmed. 20
CONCLUSION
In Guido v. State, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
the rule of Doe, that the use of police officers as agents of a grand
jury was illegal, was not a new rule of law. Even if it were, it would
12. See id. at 699.
13. See id. (citing Doe, 717 A.2d at 1136).
14. See id. (citing Doe, 717 A.2d at 1138).
15. See id. (citing Doe, 717 A.2d at 1138-39).
16. See id. at 699-700.
17. See id. (citing Doe, 717 A.2d at 1137).
18. See id. at 700.
19. See id. (citing Pailin v. Vose, 603 A.2d 738, 742 (R.I. 1992)).
20. See id.
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not apply to the defendant. If a defendant's appeal has already
been decided when a new rule is announced, then the defendant is
not entitled to retroactive application of the new rule except in cer-
tain narrow circumstances not present in the defendant's case.
Therefore, the defendant was not entitled to post-conviction relief
challenging the use at trial of medical records obtained by a police
officer unlawfully acting as an agent of the grand jury.
Joseph Proietta
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Criminal Law. Seddon v. Bonner, 755 A.2d 823 (R.I. 2000). The
Victims Rights Statute' (statute), which requires the court to enter
a civil judgment against the defendant after conviction of a felony,
does not provide the exclusive remedy for the crime victim. 2
In Seddon v. Bonner,3 the court stated that the civil judgment
rendered against the defendant conclusively established the defen-
dant's liability to the victim, but damages must be determined in a
separate judicial proceeding.4 The court also rejected the defen-
dant's argument that the statute violated his federal constitutional
rights to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution.5
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In March 1998, a jury found the defendant guilty of second-
degree child-molestation sexual assault.6 In May 1998, the plain-
tiffs commenced a civil suit and moved for an automatic civil judg-
ment against the defendant pursuant to the statute.7 The
defendant objected to the motion and argued that the statute vio-
lated his right to due process and against self-incrimination. 8 The
plaintiffs then moved to withdraw their motion for civil judgment
because the statute did not cover punitive damages. 9 The plain-
tiffs also motioned for partial summary judgment stating that the
defendant was collaterally estopped from arguing the issue of lia-
bility.10 The defendant then objected to the motion for partial
summary judgment arguing that until the statute is deemed un-
constitutional, the statute offers the victims their exclusive
remedy."
The Attorney General moved to have the questions regarding
the statute certified by the supreme court. 12 The motion was
1. R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-28-5 (1956) (2000 Reenactment).
2. 755 A.2d 823 (R.I. 2000).
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 824.
6. See id. at 825.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 824.
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granted and four questions were submitted to the supreme court
for certification. 13
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The first question the court entertained was whether the stat-
ute precluded a plaintiff from pursuing other remedies. 14 The
court stated: "when the language of a legislative enactment is clear
and unambiguous, this [clourt will interpret the statute literally
and accord the words of the statute their plain and ordinary mean-
ings."15 In the present case, the court determined that the statute
merely addresses the issue of liability of a convicted defendant to
an injured victim, and does not by its terms declare that it is the
sole remedy for the victim.16 The court found the statute to be a
mere "procedural shortcut" that established the liability of the de-
fendant but still required damages to be proven. 17 This "procedural
shortcut" does not preclude the victim from seeking alternate
means of relief from the defendant.'8 Thus, the court answered
the question in the negative; that is, the statute does not preclude
a victim from pursuing other relief.19 The second question that the
court was to certify only needed to be answered if the first question
was answered in the affirmative; thus the court moved on to the
third question.20
The third question was whether the statute required the supe-
rior court to enter a civil judgment against the convicted defen-
dant.21 The court relied on the unambiguous terms of the statute,
"a civil judgment shall automatically be entered by the trial court
13. See id. at 825.
14. See id.
15. Id. at 826 (citing Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674
A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I. 1996)). The statute reads, in part:
upon his or her final conviction of a felony after a trial by jury, a civil
judgment shall automatically be entered by the trial court against the de-
fendant conclusively establishing his or her liability to the victim for such
personal injury and/or loss of property as was sustained by the victim as a
direct and proximate cause of the felonious conduct of which the defen-
dant has been convicted.
Id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 827.
21. See id.
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against the defendant," to determine that the superior court is re-
quired to enter a civil judgment.22 Thus, the court answered the
third question in the affirmative. 23
The fourth question was whether the statute "on its face or as
applied to a Defendant who elects not to take the stand in his own
defense at the criminal trial violate that Defendant's constitutional
rights under either the 5th or 14th Amendments ... ."24 The court
stated that due process requires a full and fair hearing, which in-
cludes the opportunity by both parties to be heard, to present evi-
dence and to call witnesses.25 Here, although the defendant
elected not to testify at trial, he had the opportunity to do so. 26
Also, although the defendant did not testify at the criminal trial,
the statute requires the victim to prove damages at a subsequent
hearing, where the defendant will again have the opportunity to
testify.27
The court also disagreed with the defendant's argument that
automatic estoppel is prejudicial and violates due process. 28 The
defendant had already been found guilty under a "beyond a reason-
able doubt" standard. The court found no reason why the defen-
dant should be allowed an opportunity to relitigate the liability
issue under a lesser standard. 29 Thus, the court answered the
fourth question in the negative; that is, the statute does not violate
the defendant's constitutional rights to due process.30
CONCLUSION
In Seddon v. Bonner, the court stated that the civil judgment
rendered against the defendant conclusively established the defen-
dant's liability to the victim, but damages must be determined in a
separate judicial proceeding. The court also rejected the defen-
dant's argument that the statute violated his federal constitutional
rights to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution. Therefore, the Victims Rights
22. Id.
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 828.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
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Statute, which requires the court to enter a civil judgment against
the defendant after conviction of a felony, does not provide the ex-
clusive remedy for the crime victim.
Stan Pupecki
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Criminal Law. State v. Acciardo, 748 A.2d 811 (R.I. 2000). In
order to prove the crime of harboring, the state must prove that the
defendant knew that his or her client had committed a crime and
was subject to arrest either by warrant or based upon probable
cause.
In State v. Acciardo,I the state failed to establish the essential
element of scienter.2 The state police's decision to deliberately
misrepresent facts to the defendant caused him to believe that
there existed neither outstanding warrants for his clients nor prob-
able cause for their arrest.3 Thus, the defendant did not knowingly
shield his clients from arrest.4
Also, in regard to the crime of harboring, a criminal defense
attorney had no duty to advise his clients to surrender to the police
or to inform the police of their location himself, unless he was
aware that there existed a sound legal basis for the arrest of his
clients for a particular offense. 5
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On March 1, 1996, defendant, Gregory Acciardo (Acciardo), a
criminal defense attorney, was visited at his home by two of his
clients, Michael Rossi (Rossi) and Louis Marchetti (Marchetti).6
Rossi and Marchetti informed Acciardo that one of their former
criminal partners, Richard Hartley (Hartley), was taken from the
Adult Corrections Institution to Rhode Island State Police head-
quarters. 7 Rossi and Marchetti professed to Acciardo their belief
that Hartley would implicate them in a string of criminal offenses.8
Rossi and Marchetti sought Acciardo's advice on this matter.9
Acciardo commenced an investigation of the situation and con-
tacted the state police.10 Acciardo spoke with Detective Steven
O'Donnell and asked him if there were any outstanding warrants
1. 748 A.2d 811 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id. at 814.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 812.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
SURVEY SECTION
for Rossi and Marchetti." O'Donnell deliberately and falsely
stated that there were no outstanding felony warrants. 12 It was
undisputed at trial that the state police consciously withheld the
information concerning the existence of the felony warrants from
Acciardo. 13 It was also undisputed at trial that O'Donnell did not
disclose to Acciardo that the state police had probable cause to ar-
rest either Rossi or Marchetti.' 4
Acting on the erroneous information provided to him by the
state police, Acciardo transported Rossi and Marchetti to the unoc-
cupied apartment of his mother-in-law. 15 Apparently, Acciardo
had his clients transported to the apartment in his automobile,
provided them with food, drink, his wife's cellular phone and even
provided for Rossi's girlfriend to visit.'i
On Sunday, March 3rd, Acciardo learned that the police were
looking for Rossi at his house. 17 Acciardo counseled both Rossi and
Marchetti to surrender themselves to the police.' 8 Rossi turned
himself in on March 3rd and Marchetti surrendered on March
4th.19 Rossi also made statements to the state police connecting
Acciardo to the commission of past crimes. 20
Acciardo was indicted for several criminal offenses for which
he was acquitted and the offense of harboring for which he was
convicted.21 Acciardo appealed and the Rhode Island Supreme
Court reversed the conviction.22
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island General Laws define the crime as "know-
ingly harboring or relieving the offender, with intent that he or she
shall escape or avoid detection, arrest, trial, or punishment."23 In
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 813.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 814.
23. R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-1-4 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
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State v. Davis,24 the court held that the term "knowingly" implies
that the harborer is aware of the specific offense for which the of-
fender is charged. 25 Also, the court held that the harborer must
have intended to shield the offender from the law.26
In the present case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
in order to be found guilty of harboring, the state had the burden of
proving that Acciardo was aware that Rossi and Marchetti had in
fact perpetrated a specific crime for which they were subject to ar-
rest by a warrant or based on probable cause.27 Here, the deliber-
ate misrepresentation by the state police to Acciardo concerning
the existence of the felony warrants rules out, as a matter of law,
Acciardo's knowledge of the existence of the warrants or probable
cause.
28
Furthermore, information Acciardo received from his clients
was privileged.29 Acciardo had no duty to divulge the location of
his clients or advise them to surrender to authorities unless he was
aware of a sound legal basis for their arrest for a particular crime.
The court stated that the police do not possess "a roving commis-
sion to apprehend individuals without either a warrant or probable
cause."30 Here, the state police's misrepresentations to Acciardo
ruled out his knowledge of warrants or probable cause, thus, Ac-
ciardo was not aware of any sound legal basis for the arrest of his
clients for a particular crime.31
CONCLUSION
In State v. Acciardo, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that the deliberate misrepresentations made to Acciardo "negated
as a matter of law" his knowingly harboring his clients, and thus
the state failed to establish an essential element of the crime.
Stan Pupecki
24. 14 R.I. 281 (1883).
25. See Acciardo, 748 A.2d at 813 (citing Davis, 14 R.I. at 284).
26. See id. (citing Davis, 14 R.I. at 284).
27. See id.
28. See id. at 814.
29. See id. (citing Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 456 (1957)).
30. Id,
31. See id.
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Criminal Law. State v. Brown, 744 A.2d 831 (R.I. 2000). Admit-
ting a missing witness's prior testimony under a hearsay excep-
tion, after making a good faith attempt to locate the witness, did
not violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. Also, instruction on a lesser of-
fense is not required when it is wholly unsupported by the
evidence.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In State v. Brown,' defendant Brown appealed from a judg-
ment of conviction of first degree murder.2 Brown, along with his
co-defendant, was convicted of murder and conspiracy to murder
Sherry Roy.3 Bell, a state witness, failed to appear and testify at
trial.4 Bell did, however, testify previously at the defendant's bail
hearing.5 The trial judge, after declaring Bell unavailable, admit-
ted Bell's previous testimony into evidence pursuant to Rule
804(b)(1) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.6 The defendant
contends that this was reversible error.7
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Brown argued that the admission of Bell's testimony violated
his right to confront and cross-examine the witness.8 The supreme
court disagreed. 9 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution provides that 'the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with witnesses against
him."10 This right includes the ability to cross-examine wit-
nesses." However, Rule 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence al-
lows for the introduction of hearsay statements when the declarant
is unavailable to testify at trial.' 2 The test for determining
1. 744 A.2d 831 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id. at 833.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 834.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 835 (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 400-01 (1965)).
11. See id. (citing Pointer, 380 U.S. at 400-01).
12. See id.
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whether a witness's unavailability at trial violates the right of con-
frontation is whether the state has made a "good faith" effort to
secure the witness's presence.' 3 "Whether the state has exercised
reasonable diligence in securing the presence of a witness is as-
sessed on a case-by-case basis."14 Here, the state made repeated
attempts to find the witness. 15 These attempts included a search
of local hospitals and the training school.' 6 The Rhode Island Su-
preme Court found that the state made a reasonable and good faith
effort to secure Bell's presence at trial.17
Brown next contended that the trial justice improperly refused
to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of second-degree
murder.18 A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser-in-
cluded offense when the evidence supports a possible verdict on
that offense.' 9 The injuries of the victim suggest that she was mur-
dered "in a manner that demonstrated more than momentary re-
solve."20 The supreme court properly held that there was no
evidence to support an instruction on second-degree murder.21
CONCLUSION
In State v. Brown, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
admitting a missing witness's prior testimony as a hearsay excep-
tion, after making a good faith attempt to locate the witness, did
not violate the Confrontation Clause. Also, an instruction on a
lesser offense is not required when wholly unsupported by the
evidence.
Sheila M. Lombardi
13. See id. (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980) (quoting Barber v.
Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968))).
14. Id. (citing State v. Prout, 347 A.2d 404, 406 (1975)).
15. See id. at 836-37.
16. See id. at 836.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 837.
19. Id. at 838 (quoting State v. Messa, 594 A.2d 882, 884 (R.I. 1991)).
20. Id. at 839.
21. See id.
SURVEY SECTION
Criminal Law. State v. Chiellini, 762 A.2d 450 (R.I. 2000). A
trial justice must make an initial inquiry as to the fitness of a po-
tential prejudiced juror before he may grant a mistrial. Upon find-
ing a criminal to be a habitual offender pursuant to section 12-19-
21 of the Rhode Island General Laws, a trial justice must impose
an additional period of incarceration upon the criminal defendant.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On October 28, 1995, Nicole Benvie (Benvie) was stabbed in
her back and rushed to the hospital.' Benvie was pronounced dead
on October 29, 1995, and Robert M. Chiellini (Chiellini) was
charged with her murder.2 During the jury deliberations of Chiel-
lini's trial, Juror #237 (Juror) called attorney Richard Gonnella
(Gonnella) and told him that she was confused about the difference
between first-degree and second-degree murder.3 Gonnella told the
Juror that he was unable to talk to her and that calling him was
very serious. 4 The following day Gonnella phoned the trial judge
and informed him that the Juror had called him during the night.
Gonnella explained his version of the conversation with the Juror
and told the judge that he did not tell her any information.5
After speaking with Gonnella on the telephone, the trial jus-
tice called the Juror into his chambers and in the presence of the
defense counsel and the prosecution he questioned her on the re-
cord about her conversation with Gonnella.6 Following his conver-
sation with the Juror, the trial judge asked the defense counsel
what he would like to do.7 The defense counsel was confident that
the juror was not tainted and agreed to allow her to remain on the
jury.8 Both the defense counsel and the prosecution agreed that
they did not want to try the case again and wished to proceed with
the case and the present jury.9
After determining that both parties were satisfied with the in-
quiry of the Juror and after agreeing that both parties wished to
1. See State v. Chiellini, 762 A.2d 450, 452 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 453.
8. See id.
9. See id.
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proceed, the attorneys returned to open court without the presence
of the jury.' ° At this time Chiellini made a pro se motion for a
mistrial." Chiellini asked the trial judge for a new trial because
the jury was confused and because the trial judge had instructed
the jury not to talk to anyone and someone had. 12 The trial justice
informed Chiellini that if the Juror had actually spoken to the at-
torney, then he might lean towards passing the case, however,
since the trial justice was satisfied that the Juror did not speak to
the attorney about any legal issues he denied the motion.' 3
Chiellini was found guilty of first-degree murder.14 At Chiel-
lini's sentencing hearing, the trial justice declined to impose a req-
uisite additional sentence upon finding Chiellini to be a habitual
criminal pursuant to section 12-19-21 of the Rhode Island General
Laws.15 Both parties appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Denial of Mistrial Based on Juror Misconduct
On appeal, Chiellini argued that the trial justice erred in de-
nying his motion for a new trial because he failed to make an ade-
quate inquiry of the Juror in order to determine if she was
prejudiced in some way by her conversation with Gonnella. 16 How-
ever, "a decision to pass a case and declare a mistrial are matters
left to the sound discretion of the trial justice."'7 Furthermore, the
supreme court has no authority to reverse a trial justice's decision
to pass a case unless it is clearly wrong.' 8
The Rhode Island Supreme Court stated that if a trial justice
is concerned about the fitness of a juror, it is his or her responsibil-
ity to "conduct sufficient inquiry to make a reasoned determination
whether the juror should be discharged or may continue to
serve." 19 The supreme court also held that a "trial justice has an
affirmative duty to conduct an initial inquiry to determine whether
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. Id. (quoting State v. DaSilva, 742 A.2d 721 (R.I. 1999)).
18. See id. (citing DaSilva, 742 A.2d at 725).
19. Id. (quoting DaSilva, 742 A.2d at 725).
SURVEY SECTION
the juror has been prejudiced by the encounter so as to render the
juror unfit to continue to serve."20 Following this initial inquiry,
the trial justice must also determine if further inquiry is needed to
determine if the juror or jury has been prejudiced. 21 The supreme
court also noted that any failure on the part of the trial justice to
make such an inquiry may result in a violation of the defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights, which "requires 'diligent scrutiny' to pro-
tect the defendant's right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury."22
In the case at bar, the supreme court found that the trial jus-
tice conducted a sufficient inquiry of the Juror, made a reasoned
determination that she should remain as a juror and exercised ap-
propriate discretion in declining to pass the case.23 The supreme
court based its decision on the fact that the trial justice questioned
the Juror on the record in front of both the defense counsel and the
prosecution. 24 During such inquiry, neither party had any objec-
tion to the trial justice's line of questioning and neither offered any
other questions or suggestions to the court as to how to proceed.25
Also, when asked by the trial justice if they wished to proceed, both
sides agreed that they were satisfied with the Juror and jury and
wished to proceed. 26
Sentencing of Habitual Offender
On appeal, the state argued that the sentencing judge commit-
ted reversible error when it failed to impose an additional sentence
upon Chiellini after the court found him to be habitual criminal
pursuant to section 12-19-21 of the Rhode Island General Laws.27
Section 12-19-21 states that "upon conviction, the person deemed a
habitual criminal shall be punished by imprisonment in the adult
correctional institution for a term not exceeding twenty-five years,
in addition to any sentence imposed for the offense of which he or
she was last convicted."28
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. Id. at 454. (quoting DaSilva, 742 A.2d at 725).
23. See id.
24. See id. at 455.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-21 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
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The supreme court held that the statute "required the trial
justice to impose an additional period of incarceration upon a crim-
inal defendant if he or she is found to be a habitual criminal."29
The supreme court noted that the statute has no provision that
would allow any trial justice to exercise his or her discretion in
imposing an additional period of incarceration upon finding a de-
fendant to be a habitual criminal.30
CONCLUSION
In State v. Chiellini, the Rhode Island Supreme Court ad-
dressed the steps that a trial justice must take in order to deter-
mine the fitness of a potential prejudiced or wayward juror. The
supreme court found that the trial justice made a sufficient inquiry
to make a reasoned determination as to whether a juror had been
prejudiced by a conversation she had with an outside attorney dur-
ing jury deliberations. Therefore, the trial justice did not err in not
declaring a mistrial.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court also held that upon finding a
criminal defendant to be a habitual offender pursuant to section
12-19-21 of the Rhode Island General Laws, a trial justice has no
discretion in deciding whether to impose an additional period of
incarceration upon the criminal defendant and must do so.
Heather M. Spellman
29. Chiellini, 762 A.2d at 456.
30. See id.
SURVEY SECTION
Criminal Law. State v. Dumas, 750 A.2d 420 (R.I. 2000). Under
certain circumstances, the question "Can I get a lawyer?" can ob-
jectively be construed as an unequivocal request for counsel.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On November 9, 1990, the body of Diane Goulet (Goulet) was
found behind Shaw's Meat Market in Woonsocket, Rhode Island.'
A clothesline had been tied around her neck.2 The cause of death
was determined to be ligature strangulation.3 On October 16,
1995, Marc Dumas (Dumas), the defendant, entered the Woon-
socket police station claiming to have information concerning Gou-
let's murder.4 Over the next twelve hours, Dumas gave police a
detailed account of the facts surrounding the crime.5 Dumas's ac-
count implicated Mike Jellison as the one who had committed the
murder.6
Portions of Dumas's statement were videotaped. 7 While the
video camera was turned off, police showed Dumas photos of Gou-
let's corpse in an attempt to trigger his memory as to details he
could not recall.8 After looking at the photos, Dumas told police
that he was the one who had tied the rope around Goulet's neck.9
Police immediately stopped questioning Dumas, advised him of his
constitutional rights and had him sign a rights form. 10
Ten minutes later, the police resumed their videotaped ques-
tioning of Dumas." Dumas's constitutional rights were again ex-
plained, this time on videotape. 12 At some point thereafter,
Dumas used the word "lawyer."' 3 The poor quality of the tape,
even after the state had it digitally enhanced, made it extremely
difficult to determine exactly what Dumas said.14 Not surpris-
1. See State v. Dumas, 750 A.2d 420, 422 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 422-23 & n.2.
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ingly, the prosecution and defense did not agree as to the interpre-
tation of the tape. The prosecution contended that the defendant
asked, "Do I need a lawyer?"'u The defense maintained that Du-
mas asked, "Can I get a lawyer?" 16 Although the trial justice could
not tell exactly what was said, she denied the defense counsel's re-
quest that a neutral expert be appointed to determine exactly what
was said.17 The trial justice based her denial on her conclusion
that neither interpretation of the tape constituted an unequivocal
request for counsel, and therefore the police did not violate Du-
mas's constitutional rights by continuing to question him after the
statement was made.' Accordingly, she denied Dumas's motion to
suppress his statements made after his "lawyer" reference. 19
Dumas was found guilty of second-degree murder after his
January 1997 trial.20 Dumas appealed to the supreme court alleg-
ing that the trial justice erred by not granting his motion for a con-
tinuance so that a neutral expert could determine exactly what he
said in his reference to a "lawyer."21 Dumas further claimed that
even if his reference to a lawyer was an equivocal request for coun-
sel, the Rhode Island Constitution required police to ask follow up
questions to determine if he was in fact making a request for coun-
sel. 22 Finally, Dumas claimed that the trial justice erred by not
instructing the jury on mistake of fact because if the jury accepted
his claim that he believed Goulet was dead before he tied the rope
around her neck, that would serve as a defense to the murder
charge. 23
15. Id. at 423.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. Dumas's post-"lawyer" statement was an admission in which he claimed
that he acquiesced to Jellison's demands that he tie the rope around Goulet's neck
and engage in sexual contact with the corpse. Dumas claimed that he believed
that Goulet was already dead. According to the defendant, Jellison forced him to
perform these acts so that he would be implicated in the crime and refrain from
telling anyone what had happened. See id. at 422-23.
20. See id. at 423.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
SURVEY SECTION
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court only addressed
Dumas's first claim of error, which was the trial justice's refusal to
appoint an expert to determine exactly what Dumas said when he
mentioned the word "lawyer." Although the trial justice stated
that she heard, "Do I need a lawyer?," she specifically stated that it
was not necessary to make a finding on the issue because "[elither
interpretation of [the] sentence is not an unequivocal invocation of
the right to counsel."24
When invoking his right to counsel, "'a suspect need not speak
with the discrimination of an Oxford don'..... 25 Rather, a suspect
need only make a statement that would communicate to a reasona-
ble officer in like circumstances that he is requesting an attor-
ney. 26 The supreme court held that the statement, "Can I get a
lawyer?" can be an unequivocal request for counsel in some circum-
stances. 27 Accordingly, the trial justice was in error by not making
a specific finding as to exactly what Dumas said during the
questioning. 28
The Rhode Island Supreme Court remanded the case, stating
that the trial justice must make a finding of fact as to what Dumas
said and whether the statement was an unequivocal request for
counsel. 29 In making that finding, the trial justice should rely on a
court-appointed neutral expert who is qualified to obtain the best
videotape enhancement available.30 The expert should also gather
testimony of the police officers present during the questioning con-
cerning their recollections of the statement. 31
If, after the further examination of the statement and sur-
rounding circumstances, the trial justice finds that the statement
amounts to an unequivocal request for counsel, a new trial should
be granted. 32 If, however, the trial judge finds the statement to be
an equivocal request for counsel, the case should be returned to the
24. Id. at 424.
25. Id. at 425 (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1994)).
26. See id.
27. Id. at 425.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
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supreme court to review that finding as well as Dumas's two re-
maining claims of error.33
CONCLUSION
The determination of whether a request for counsel is une-
quivocal depends on the exact language used by the suspect and
the surrounding circumstances. In this case, the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island held that, in certain situations, the statement, "Can I
get a lawyer?," can amount to an unequivocal request for counsel.
Michael J. Daly
33. See id. at 426.
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Criminal Law. State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038 (R.I. 2000). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the statements and testi-
mony of two witnesses were not coerced, that the prior testimony of
an unavailable witness was properly admitted at trial, that the
same witness's purported recantation of this testimony was prop-
erly excluded and that the defendant's statement regarding un-
charged prior bad acts was properly admitted under the exceptions
to Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 404(b) to show motive, settled
purpose and malicious intent of the accused. While a limiting in-
struction following the introduction of such evidence is advisable,
the trial justice's failure to repeat this instruction a second time
when the defense objection was renewed during the prosecution's
closing did not constitute reversible error.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
At midnight on February 26, 1993, a house located at 54 Hay-
wood Street in Providence, Rhode Island, burned as a result of ar-
son, killing four children and their parents as they slept in their
third floor apartment.' This tragedy had its beginnings earlier
that same day, when two cars met each other while traveling from
opposite directions on Haywood Street. 2 The drivers of the two re-
spective vehicles, Jose Tapia (Tapia) and William Cifredo (Cifredo)
were cousins, and stopped their cars in the street to have a conver-
sation.3 Jose Garcia (Garcia), the defendant, was a passenger in
the car driven by Tapia.4 While the two vehicles were stopped on
the street another car suddenly backed out of a driveway located at
54 Haywood Street and collided with Tapia's automobile. 5 This
sparked an altercation between Tapia and the driver of the offend-
ing car, Samuel Lorenzo (Lorenzo).6
While Tapia and Lorenzo were arguing over the collision, a
passenger riding in Lorenzo's car, Jorge Diep (Diep), left the vehi-
cle and briefly went into the house located at 54 Haywood Street. 7
Shortly thereafter, Diep "jumped into the driver's seat of Lorenzo's
1. See State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1042 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
2001] 677
678 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:593
vehicle, shoved the gear into reverse, slammed his foot on the gas
pedal, and bashed the vehicle into Tapia's car."8 In response to
this, Cifredo jumped out of the driver's seat of his car and began
yelling at Diep to stop.9 Rather than stopping, Diep proceeded to
run over Cifredo with Lorenzo's car, "trapping him underneath the
car and dragging him several hundred feet down the road until
[Cifredo's] body finally dropped free of the chassis." 10 Cifredo was
taken by ambulance to Rhode Island Hospital, where he immedi-
ately underwent hours of emergency surgery for his injuries."
The defendant, Garcia, witnessed the incident and accompa-
nied the family and friends of Cifredo to the hospital. 12 While
awaiting an update on Cifredo's condition, Garcia reportedly "came
screaming on the ramp, [and] told everyone ... they [were] going to
get them for what they did to Will."13 Garcia also reportedly stated
that "he [had previously] burned [a] crackhead's house down be-
cause he owed him $600."14 After saying this, Garcia left the hos-
pital with Tapia and others, and proceeded by car back to the
Haywood Street area where the previous incident occurred. 15
Once there, witnesses saw Garcia and Tapia walk in the direction
of the house that Diep had entered earlier that day carrying a
container filled with gasoline, and ten minutes later heard the two
men boast that they had poured gasoline throughout the house lo-
cated at 54 Haywood Street and left it ablaze. 16
While neither Lorenzo nor Diep actually lived at 54 Haywood
Street or were injured by the fire, the defendant's act of arson did
result in the deaths of Carlos Chang, Hilda DeRosario and their
four children.17 The next day, after receiving word that the police
were questioning possible witnesses to the defendant's crime, Gar-
cia fled to New York City.'8 Nine days later he was discovered by
police while trying to escape through a window of his mother-in-
8. Id.
9. See id.
10. Id.
11, See id.
12. See id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 1042-43.
16. See id. at 1043.
17. See id.
18. See id.
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law's apartment in the Bronx.19 Afterwards, a jury convicted Gar-
cia of arson, conspiracy to commit arson and the felony murder of
the Chang family.20 He was sentenced to two concurrent terms of
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, plus ten years
to serve, followed by four consecutive life sentences.21
Garcia appealed his conviction, claiming that the police state-
ments and testimony of witnesses were the result of police coercion
and should have been suppressed. 22 The defendant also argued
that the trial justice erred in admitting the prior recorded testi-
mony of an unavailable witness without also admitting into evi-
dence the witness's later testimony attempting to recant the prior
statement.23 Additionally, Garcia asserted that character evidence
of prior wrongs committed by the accused was improperly admitted
by the prosecution to prove that the defendant's current actions
were in conformity therewith. 24 Garcia also averred that his sen-
tence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was
excessive.25
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Coerced Testimony
The court held that the police statements and consistent trial
testimony of two witnesses were not coerced by the police, and that
the defendant's right to due process was not violated by the intro-
duction of this testimony against him at his trial.26 The court con-
sidered the totality of the circumstances surrounding how this
evidence was gathered and presented at trial, and concluded that
the testimony offered against Garcia was not the product of coer-
cion. 27 First, the court noted that potential witnesses do not enjoy
the same due process protections as do suspected criminals being
held for interrogation, and that even when a witness is coerced into
implicating a person, "the mere fact that a witness has given the
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 1046.
24. See id. at 1047.
25. See id. at 1056-57.
26. See id. at 1043.
27. See id. at 1044.
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police such a statement during the investigation of a crime does
not necessarily prevent the witness from testifying voluntarily at
trial in a manner consistent with the pretrial statement."28
After independently reviewing the facts surrounding the police
statements of two witnesses who implicated Garcia, the court held
that while some questionable police tactics had been used initially
with each of these respective witnesses, the actual statements that
they each made implicating Garcia were made on different occa-
sions in which no police coercion was alleged. 29 Further, the court
noted that no police coercion of either witness was alleged during
the time period between their police statements and later testi-
mony at the bail hearings and trial, that both witnesses testified
voluntarily at these later proceedings and that they were free at
that point to alter their statements.30 The court concluded that the
trial justice's finding that the witnesses' testimony was not coerced
contained no clear error, and that the lower court's decision not to
suppress the statements and testimony did not establish that the
defendant's federal constitutional rights were denied. 31 The su-
preme court also held that the mere fact that these witnesses may
have entered into non-prosecution, plea-bargaining or immunity
agreements with the authorities in exchange for their testimony
did not destroy its voluntariness and did not render it coerced. 32
Admissibility of Prior Testimony of Unavailable Witness and His
Purported Recantation
The supreme court held that the trial justice properly admit-
ted the prior testimony of Jose Cifredo, William Cifredo's
brother.33 Jose Cifredo was arrested in the days following the fire,
and later inculpated Garcia in the crime of arson through both a
written statement and his bail hearing testimony.34 Later, Jose
Cifredo recanted his testimony against Garcia at a voir dire hear-
ing.35 At Garcia's trial Jose Cifredo invoked his constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination, and became unavailable to
28. Id.
29. See id. at 1044-45.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 1044.
32. See id. at 1046.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
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testify as a witness against Garcia.3 6 The court held that the trial
justice properly allowed the prosecution to read Jose Cifredo's bail
hearing testimony in accordance with Rhode Island Rule of Evi-
dence 804(b)(1), because compelling Cifredo to testify at Garcia's
trial would have "required him to concede under oath that he had
lied in his earlier police statement and in his sworn bail hearing
testimony," subjecting him to prosecution for filing a false police
statement and perjury.37
The court also held that the trial justice did not err in denying
the defendant's motion to admit Cifredo's subsequent voir dire tes-
timony, wherein Cifredo attempted to recant this earlier state-
ments regarding Garcia.38 Addressing this issue, the court noted
the trial justice's conclusion, based on his observation of the wit-
ness, "[that Cifredol just did not want to testify, and more particu-
larly, he did not want to testify against his cousin, Mr. Tapia, who
was still involved in the case at that time."39 Because Cifredo's
recantation was not corroborated by "circumstances clearly indi-
cat[ing] the trustworthiness of the statement," and was, in fact,
contradicted by his previous statement to the police, the supreme
court upheld the trial court's decision to exclude this testimony in
accordance with Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). 40 The
court also rejected the defendant's claim that Cifredo's bail hearing
testimony was coerced, stating that virtually no evidence was of-
fered in support of this assertion.41
Prior Uncharged Wrongs of the Accused
The majority of the court upheld the trial justice's decision to
admit in evidence witness testimony regarding Garcia's claim that
he committed a prior act of arson at an earlier date.42 Although
recognizing that defense counsel originally objected to this testi-
36. See id.
37. Id. at 1046 (quoting R.I. R. Evid. 804(b)(1)). The Rule states that when a
witness is unavailable to testify at trial Irlecorded testimony given as a witness at
another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, [is admissible] if the party
against whom the testimony is now offered,. . . had an opportunity to develop the
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination." Id.
38. See id. at 1046-47.
39. Id. at 1047.
40. Id. (quoting R.I. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)).
41. See id. at 1047.
42. See id. at 1048.
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mony during the trial as violating Rhode Island Rule of Evidence
404(b), the majority emphasized that the objection was withdrawn,
and could not now be a point of error on appeal.43 However, the
majority noted that defense counsel did secure a jury instruction
on the inadmissibility of character evidence to prove a propensity
inference against the accused, and did object to the prosecutor's
improper argument in his closing that the defendant acted in con-
formity with his character.4" The majority addressed the merits of
the evidence issue, and concluded that testimony about the defen-
dant's alleged prior bad act of arson was properly admitted by the
trial justice. 45 The majority held that the character evidence of the
defendant's statements regarding his prior crime of arson was not
introduced to prove that the defendant acted in conformity with his
character, but rather to prove motive, the "settled purpose" of the
accused to achieve revenge through arson, and his "malicious in-
tent to burn down 54 Haywood Street that very night."46 Further,
the majority emphasized that it was Garcia's statement itself, and
not whether he had in fact committed the prior act of arson, that
was relevant in proving his motive, settled purpose and malicious
intent.47 The majority also upheld the admission of Garcia's prior
statement because it was "an important part of the factual back-
ground" concerning how a conspiracy to commit the crime of arson
was formulated between the defendant, Tapia and others.48
The majority recognized that Garcia's statement about his
prior act of arson was also relevant to prove that the defendant
acted in conformity with his character on February 26, 1993. How-
ever, the court reasoned that "the mere fact that the jury is capable
of using prior-bad-act evidence for such purposes does not mandate
43. See id. Rule 404(b) states:
Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts,
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that
the person acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, prepara-
tion, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or to prove
that the defendant feared imminent bodily harm and that the fear was
reasonable.
R.I. R. Evid. 404(b).
44. See Garcia, 743 A.2d at 1049.
45. See id. at 1050-53.
46. Id. at 1050.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 1051.
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its exclusion under Rule 404(b) because that rule does not 'require
exclusion of otherwise legally probative evidence simply because
such evidence might also suggest past criminal activity.'" 49 The
majority concluded that Garcia's statement was independently rel-
evant to prove motive and settled purpose, and was thus properly
admitted by the trial justice.50 However, the majority suggested
that "the better practice" when evidence of prior bad acts of the
accused is admitted under one of the exceptions to Rule 404(b) is
for the trial justice to immediately provide the jury with a limiting
instruction "without waiting for one of the parties either to request
such an instruction or to object to the trial justice's failure to do
so."51 Here, the trial justice originally followed the admission of
Garcia's statement with a proper limiting instruction regarding
the inadmissibility of character evidence to prove the defendant ac-
ted in conformity therewith.52 The majority noted that the prose-
cutor violated this instruction by arguing to the jury in his closing
argument that what Garcia was doing that night "was acting in
conformity about [sic] what he had done," and that defense counsel
properly objected to this argument.53 However, the court held that
the trial justice's failure to sustain the objection or offer another
limiting instruction was harmless error.54
The court determined that the defendant's other arguments
were without merit, and upheld the full length of his sentence
without possibility of parole. 55 The court argued that Garcia's sen-
tence was supported by section 11-23-2(2) of the Rhode Island Gen-
eral Laws, since Garcia's crime constituted conduct "committed in
a manner creating great risk of death to more than one person,"
and no evidence of mitigating factors, such as remorse, was pro-
duced in the defendant's favor at trial.56
49. Id. (quoting State v. Gordon, 508 A.2d 1339, 1348 (R.I. 1986)).
50. See id. at 1052.
51. Id. at 1053.
52. See id. at 1048-49, 1054.
53. Id. at 1054.
54. See id. at 1054-55.
55. See id. at 1056-57.
56. Id. at 1057 (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2(2) (1956) (1997
Reenactment)).
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The Concurrence and Dissent
Chief Justice Weisberger wrote a separate opinion concurring
with the majority as to the first two issues in the case, but dissent-
ing as to the third issue.57 The Chief Justice asserted that this
evidence was in fact character evidence introduced by the prosecu-
tion to prove that the defendant acted in conformity therewith on
the date in question in direct violation of Rule 404(b), and would
have held that the trial justice erred in admitting such a statement
in evidence.58 The Chief Justice rejected the majority's argument
that the evidence could have been admitted to show motive, plan or
design, reasoning that the statement concerned a prior incident in
New York and had no relationship with the defendant's motive,
plan, or design to commit arson on the date in question. 59 The
Chief Justice argued that the trial justice should have excluded the
defendant's statement regarding his prior bad act during the pre-
trial motions in limine.60 Chief Justice Weisberger would have
held that the trial justice's failure to provide a limiting instruction
following the prosecution's impermissible inference in closing con-
stituted reversible error, and would have awarded the defendant a
new trial in which the character evidence was completely
excluded. 61
CONCLUSION
In State v. Garcia, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
witness testimony against the defendant was not coerced, that the
prior testimony of an unavailable witness was properly admissible,
that the purported recantation of this testimony by the same wit-
ness was properly held inadmissible because of insufficient corrob-
oration and that the statement of the accused regarding a prior
bad act was properly admitted under the recognized exceptions to
Rule 404(b) to prove the defendant's motive, settled purpose and
malicious intent to commit the crime in question. The trial jus-
tice's failure to provide a second limiting instruction after the pros-
57. See id.
58. See id. at 1057-61.
59. See id. at 1060.
60. See id. at 1061.
61. See id.
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ecution argued an impermissible propensity inference in closing
arguments was not reversible error.
Lucy H. Holmes
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Criminal Law. State v. Manocchio, 743 A.2d 556 (R.I. 2000).
There is no inherent power in the superior court to order the ex-
pungement of certain Bureau of Criminal Identification (BCI)
records, particularly in light of clear statutory guidelines for the
expungement of records.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In State v. Manocchio,' respondent Louis Manocchio (Ma-
nocchio) filed a motion on June 16, 1998, to expunge entries in the
BCI records that related to him.2 The records contained entries
involving the dismissal of some criminal charges, his release from
incarceration and a deferred sentence he had received. 3 The court
reasoned that the expungement request fell within the court's gen-
eral supervisory authority over these matters; therefore, the court
granted the request to expunge.4 The state argued that the strict
terms of Rhode Island General Laws sections 12-1-12, 12-1-12.1
and 12-1.3-1 prevented the granting of this request.5 The supreme
court issued a writ of certiorari and ordered the parties to show
cause why the petition should not be summarily decided; after
cause was not shown, the supreme court decided the issue.6
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court decided that the lower court
had no inherent authority to expunge the records.7 The state suc-
cessfully argued that the court had no power to do what it did.8
First, the state argued that section 12-1-7 requires that records
should be maintained on individuals who, for example, have been
convicted of a felony or are well-known and habitual criminals. 9
The state contended that the respondent was a well-known and
habitual criminal and that there was a duty, therefore, to maintain
the challenged records. 10
1. 743 A.2d 556 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
SURVEY SECTION
More importantly, the state argued that the plain language of
section 12-1-2 did not allow the lower court judge to expunge the
records." Section 12-1-2 of the Rhode Island General Laws clearly
prevents the destruction of records if the person was previously
convicted of a felony. 12 The court reasoned that because the re-
spondent had previously received a five-year suspended sentence
for assault and robbery, he was a convicted felon when the later
charges were dismissed.13 The state further relied upon section
12-1-12.1(a) in support of its arguments, which provides for the
sealing of records in a case in which the person has been acquitted
or exonerated, provided that they have not previously been con-
victed of a felony.14 The respondent had agreed to plead guilty to
conspiracy to commit murder in 1968 and, therefore, he was not
eligible to have his records sealed or destroyed pursuant to sec-
tions 12-1-12 or 12-1-12.1(a).' 5 In addition, the respondent was
not a first time offender, which prevented another possible avenue
for expungement.16 Because of the respondent's prior criminal in-
volvement, the court reasoned that there was no argument that he
had exhibited good moral character, which is a requirement for the
expungement process. 17 The court noted, in fact, that neither the
respondent nor the hearing justice contended that there was any
statutory authority for the court's actions.' 8
The state further argued that there was no inherent power of
the superior court to expunge without the express delegation of
lawmaking authority by the Rhode Island General Assembly or a
statute. 19 The supervisory power provided to the superior court to
govern proceedings before them is limited by rules that are consti-
tutionally authorized. 20 For further support of the state's argu-
ment, the supreme court cited another supreme court decision
where the court declined to exercise its supervisory role in creating
an exclusionary rule for improperly used expungement records,
11. See id. at 557.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id. (citing State v. DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266, 1276 (R.I. 1998)).
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deeming that it was not fit to create rules when the Rhode Island
General Assembly had declined to do S0.21
The extent of the jurisdiction of the courts is prescribed by law
of the Rhode Island General Assembly.22 The Rhode Island Gen-
eral Assembly has provided for the superior court's jurisdiction
over equity actions, actions at law and criminal actions, as well as
actions of the kind involved in this proceeding. 23 However, there is
also a clear statutory scheme for the maintaining, handling, seal-
ing and expunging of BCI records. 24 Thus, the lower court has no
statutory authority to act; if it could, the statutes would have no
value.25 Therefore, the court had no statutory authority or inher-
ent power to grant the respondent's requests for expungement.
CONCLUSION
In State v. Manocchio, the Rhode Island Supreme Court de-
nied that the superior court had the inherent authority to order the
expungement of BCI records. The superior court's authority is de-
rived from statutes passed by the Rhode Island General Assembly.
The Rhode Island General Assembly passed laws in which the
plain meaning of the statutes was contrary to the judge's actions.
Therefore, no inherent authority can exist for the judiciary in a
sphere where the Legislature has not granted that authority to the
court.
Stephen P. Cooney
21. See id. (citing State v. Jackson, 570 A.2d 1115, 1117 (R.I. 1990)).
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 558.
25. See id.
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Criminal Law. State v. Tucker, 747 A.2d 451 (R.I. 2000). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the superior court did not
exceed its authority under section 12-19-9 of the Rhode Island
General Laws when it partially revoked a defendant's original sus-
pended sentence and ordered the defendant to serve a portion of
the sentence, while retaining the remainder of the suspended sen-
tence and the defendant's unserved probation period.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On June 3, 1996, defendant Christopher G. Tucker (Tucker)
entered a plea of nolo contendere to charges that he unlawfully ob-
tained more than $500 under false pretenses. The superior court
sentenced him to six years in prison, which it suspended.' The
court also sentenced Tucker to six years of probation. 2 On April 8,
1998, the superior court found that Tucker had violated the terms
of his probation, and ordered him to serve eighteen months of his
previously suspended sentence, suspending the remaining fifty-
four months, and fifty-four months of probation.3 Tucker served
the eighteen months required by the court, and then filed a motion
pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of
Criminal Procedure to have his sentence corrected.4 In addition,
Tucker filed a motion for entry of judgment by default consistent
with Rule 55.5 The superior court denied both of these motions. 6
Tucker appealed only the court's denial of his Rule 35 motion,
arguing that the superior court did not have the authority under
section 12-19-9 of the Rhode Island General Laws 7 to both commit
1. See State v. Tucker, 747 A.2d 451, 452 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 452-53.
4. See id. at 453.
5. See id.
6. See id. (citing Accord State v. Ducharme, 601 A.2d 937, 946 (R.I. 1991)
(stating that "the appropriate procedure for challenging an improper or illegal sen-
tence is to seek a revision of that sentence initially in the Superior Court pursuant
to Rule 35")).
7. The statute provides as follows:
Upon a determination that the defendant has violated the terms and con-
ditions of his or her probation the court, in open court and in the presence
of the defendant, may remove the suspension and order the defendant
committed on the sentence previously imposed, or on a lesser sentence, or
impose a sentence if one has not been previously imposed, or may con-
tinue the suspension of a sentence previously imposed, as to the court may
seem just and proper.
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him to serve a sentence of eighteen months and continue the re-
mainder of his original suspended sentence.8 Tucker asserted that
the statute limits judges hearing probation violations to either re-
voking previously suspended sentences completely and ordering
the defendant to serve the term of the sentence in prison, or contin-
uing the remainder of the suspended sentence. 9 Because any revo-
cation of a suspended sentence following a probation violation
relates back to the sentence for the underlying offense, the defen-
dant also contended that the superior court's reinstatement of his
suspended sentence after completing a prison term violates the
constitutional bar against double jeopardy. 10
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The supreme court first noted that Tucker had failed to file his
Rule 35 motion requesting that his sentence be corrected within
the required 120 days from the date that his sentence was modified
by the superior court. 1 ' As a result, the superior court would have
lacked the authority to reduce or correct Tucker's sentence pursu-
ant to the court's discretionary power under Rule 35 to relieve the
defendant of an illegally imposed or overly harsh sentence. 12 How-
ever, the court concluded that because Tucker was asking for relief
from an illegal sentence rather than one illegally imposed, Rule
35's 120-day time limit did not impede the superior court's ability
to correct an illegal sentence, and did not bar this case from consid-
eration on the merits by the supreme court. 13
The court then turned to Tucker's argument, and concluded
that the superior court acted within the scope of its authority in
ordering a continuation of Tucker's remaining suspended sentence
after requiring Tucker to serve eighteen months of that sentence in
prison.14 The court analyzed the open discretionary language of
section 12-19-9 of the Rhode Island General Laws, and determined
that the General Assembly intended to give violation-hearing
R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-9 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
8. See Tucker, 747 A.2d at 453.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. (citing State v. Letourneau, 446 A.2d 746, 748 (R.I. 1982) (noting
that the 120-day time limit is jurisdictional and cannot be enlarged)).
13. See id.
14. See id.
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judges wide latitude in choosing which of the provided disposition
options to impose on a probation violator. 15 Although judges hear-
ing probation violation cases cannot impose "additional probation-
ary period s] after the execution of a suspended sentence,"1 6 the
court found that the "second option" under section 12-19-9, which
allows the suspended sentence to be removed upon the imposition
of a lesser sentence for the probation violator, provides these
judges with broad discretion to decide whether a probation violator
should have his suspended sentence "removed in whole, in part, or
not at all."17
The court upheld the superior court's imposition of eighteen
months of incarceration for Tucker, with the remaining months of
his sentence suspended with probation, as this sentence consti-
tuted a lesser amount of physical incarceration than Tucker would
have received if the suspension of his original six-year sentence
was revoked.18 This holding is consistent with the court's previous
statement that "[tihe reduction contemplated by Rule 35 is a short-
ening of the period of imprisonment."19 The court noted that the
superior court's imposition of fifty-four months of probation follow-
ing Tucker's prison term was not an addition to the amount of pro-
bation originally imposed on Tucker in his 1996 sentencing, and
recognized that such an addition, if imposed, "would have consti-
tuted an illegal sentence to the extent of the overage."20 Here, the
violation-hearing judge imposed a sentence within the authoriza-
tion of section 12-19-9 by revoking a portion of Tucker's suspended
sentence and continuing the suspension of the remaining portion of
the original sentence, including the remaining unserved months of
probation.21
The court reviewed two recent decisions that are consistent
with this holding. In State v. Heath,22 the defendant was origi-
nally sentenced to five years' imprisonment, with six months to
15. See id. (referring to the General Assembly's use of the words "may" and "as
to the court may seem just and proper" in R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-9 (1956) (1994
Reenactment)).
16. Id. at 454 (quoting State v. Taylor, 473 A.2d 290, 291 (R.I. 1984)).
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. Id. (quoting State v. O'Rourke, 463 A.2d 1328, 1331 (R.I. 1983)).
20. Id. (citing Taylor, 473 A.2d at 291).
21. See id.
22. 659 A.2d 116 (R.I. 1995).
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serve and the remainder of the sentence suspended with proba-
tion.23 On three separate occasions the defendant was adjudged to
have violated the terms of his probation. 24 In the first instance,
the violation-hearing judge ordered the defendant to serve six
more months of his original sentence and continued to suspend the
remainder.25 After the second probation violation, the judge hear-
ing the matter committed the defendant to serve another six
months of his originally suspended sentence, but through a clerical
error did not indicate that the remainder of the defendant's sen-
tence was to be suspended. 26 Following the defendant's third pro-
bation violation, the defendant objected to the third violation-
hearing judge correcting the previous clerical error by regarding
the remaining portion of his sentence as having been suspended. 27
The defendant argued that the third violation-hearing judge had
exceeded his authority under section 12-19-9 by correcting the
oversight.28 When the supreme court heard Heath's argument, it
held that the superior court had acted within its authority in cor-
recting the clerical error, and "did not comment adversely upon the
first violation-hearing judge's decision to require the defendant to
serve six months in prison and to continue the suspension for the
remaining four-year balance of his original sentence."29
The court also pointed to State v. Rice,30 in which the supreme
court approved of a probation violation judge's decision to split two
original and concurrent fourteen-year sentences with probation
into an order for the defendant to serve two years in prison and a
twelve-year suspended sentence with probation. 31 In Rice, the
court held that violation-hearing judges may remove a suspended
period from an original sentence, provided that they work within
the time-frame of the original sentence, and do not add to or de-
crease the length of the original sentence. 32 Further, the court
commented in Rice that probation violators should be encouraged
23. See Tucker, 747 A.2d at 454 (citing Heath, 659 A.2d at 116).
24. See id. (citing Heath, 659 A.2d at 116).
25. See id. (citing Heath, 659 A.2d at 116).
26. See id. (citing Heath, 659 A-2d at 116).
27. See id. (citing Heath, 659 A.2d at 116).
28. See id. (citing Heath, 659 A.2d at 117).
29. Id. (citing Heath, 659 A.2d at 117).
30. 727 A.2d 1229 (R.I. 1999).
31. See Tucker, 747 A.2d at 454 (citing Rice, 727 A.2d at 1231-32).
32. See id.
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to admit probation violations in order to decrease the likelihood of
receiving an order from a violation-hearing judge to serve the en-
tire amount of his remaining original sentence in prison.33 The
court recognized that this comment in Rice and its decision in
Heath had constituted its implied approval of probation violation
judges' actions regarding the partial revocation of an originally
suspended sentence, and acknowledged the court's intention to
clarify its position expressly in this opinion. 34
The court discounted Tucker's interpretation of section 12-19-
9 of the Rhode Island General Laws, saying that such an "all-or-
nothing interpretation" would encourage defendants with lengthy
suspended sentences to violate their probation on a minor offense
thereby having the bulk of their suspended sentence extin-
guished.35 The court rejected such an interpretation, saying that it
would frustrate one of the main purposes for which section 12-19-9
was enacted, to establish probation as "conditional liberty that
may be revoked if [defendants] violate the terms of their probation
agreement."36
Addressing Tucker's double jeopardy argument, the court con-
cluded that the defendant was not placed in double jeopardy
through his probation revocation hearing, because the hearing it-
self operates as a continuation of the original proceeding against
the defendant.37 Since the hearing does not constitute a new pro-
ceeding, the defendant "is not twice placed in jeopardy for the same
offense when the facts litigated at the hearing are later used to
support a criminal prosecution."38
CONCLUSION
In State v. Tucker, the Rhode Island Supreme Court deter-
mined that the superior court did not exceed its authority under
section 12-19-9 of the Rhode Island General Laws when it revoked
part of the defendant's original suspended sentence and instituted
an order for the defendant to serve a portion of that original sen-
33. See id. at 455 (citing Rice, 727 A.2d at 1232).
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. Id. (quoting State v. Gobern, 423 A.2d 117, 1179 (R.I. 1981)).
37. See id.
38. Id. (quoting State v. Chase, 588 A.2d 120, 122 (R.I. 1991) (citing Hardy v.
United States, 578 A.2d 178, 181 (D.C. App. 1990)).
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tence in prison, while continuing to suspend the remainder of the
sentence, with the defendant's remaining term of probation from
his original conviction. The court also concluded that the defen-
dant was not placed in double jeopardy when his original convic-
tion was referred to at his probation revocation hearing.
Lucy H. Holmes
SURVEY SECTION
Criminal Law. State ex rel. Town of South Kingstown v. Reilly,
745 A.2d 745 (R.I. 2000). Under Rhode Island Department of
Health Regulations, a drunk driving suspect must be given two
breathalyzer tests, the second not to be taken until at least thirty
minutes after the first. Although police measured the thirty-min-
ute time span in minutes, not seconds, the test results were
admissible.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In September 1998, the South Kingstown Police arrested the
defendant for suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol.1
The defendant consented to a breathalyzer test.2 At 1:33 a.m., the
police administered the first breathalyzer, which showed a blood
alcohol level of .182%.3 At 2:03 a.m., the police administered the
second breathalyzer, which showed a blood alcohol level of .173%. 4
At the time of this action, the legal blood alcohol level limit was0.1%.5
The defendant filed a pre-trial motion in district court to sup-
press the breathalyzer results.6 The defendant's suppression mo-
tion alleged that the breathalyzer test results were invalid because
of police failure to observe Rhode Island Department of Health reg-
ulations for administering breathalyzer tests. 7 Under these regu-
lations, two breathalyzer tests must be given to a suspect." The
second test is not to be given until thirty minutes after the first.,
The defendant argued that since the breathalyzer machine used
did not record time in seconds, there was no proof as to whether or
not exactly thirty minutes had elapsed between the two blood
tests, and therefore the test results should be inadmissible. 10 The
trial judge agreed and granted the motion to suppress." The
1. See State ex rel. Town of South Kingstown v. Reilly, 745 A.2d 745, 746
(R.I. 2000).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id. Since this case was decided, the legal blood alcohol level has been
reduced to 0.08%. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2 (1956) (2000 Reenactment).
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 747 (citing R.I. Code R. 14 060 CRIR 014-2).
9. See id. (citing R.I. Code R. 14 060 CRIR 014-10).
10. See id. at 746.
11. See id.
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Town of South Kingstown petitioned the Rhode Island Supreme for
writ of certiorari, which was granted. 12
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On certiorari, the supreme court quashed the district court or-
der suppressing the breathalyzer results. 13 The court held that
the regulation in question did not require the time between
breathalyzer tests to be measured in seconds, but only in min-
utes.14 Furthermore, the motion to suppress should not have been
granted in this case because the defendant failed to show that the
validity of the test results had been affected in any way.15
The court conceded that under its earlier holding in State v.
Snyder,'6 the admissibility of a chemical test in a criminal drunk
driving case depends upon compliance with the relevant regula-
tions promulgated by the Rhode Island Department of Health.' 7
These regulations state that the second test is given "when at least
thirty (30) minutes have elapsed following the taking of the first
breath sample."' 8 As indicated by those regulations, the purpose of
taking a second breathalyzer test at least thirty minutes after the
first is to validate the results of the first test.19 The regulation on
its face does not require the thirty-minute interval to be measured
in seconds, but only in minutes. 20 Since the police administered
the first test at 1:33 a.m., and the second test at 2:03 a.m., the
court held that the police had complied with the requirement of a
thirty-minute interval.2 1 Furthermore, that second test showed
that the defendant's blood alcohol level was still well over the legal
limit.22 The court thus concluded that the second test validated
the results of the first, and evidenced that the defendant had been
driving while under the influence. 23 Therefore, the police had not
violated the regulation.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 747.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. 692 A.2d 705 (1996).
17. See Snyder, 692 A.2d at 706.
18. Id.
19. See Reilly, 745 A.2d at 747 (citing R.I. Code R. 14 060 CRIR 014-10).
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
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Additionally, the court noted that a mere failure to observe
testing regulations does not automatically entitle a defendant to
an order suppressing the test results. In Snyder, the court had
held that while the police had failed to follow a procedural check-
list for administering chemical tests, the results were not automat-
ically inadmissible. 24 Instead, the court had required the
defendant to demonstrate that the failure to follow the checklist
had adversely affected the validity of the results. 25 Similarly, the
court reasoned, the defendant in this case had never demonstrated
that the failure to measure the thirty-minute interval in seconds
had affected the results of the test in any way. Therefore, even if
the failure to measure the thirty-minute interval in seconds rather
than minutes had been a "technical" violation of testing regula-
tions, the defendant would still have not been entitled to an order
suppressing his test results.26
CONCLUSION
In State ex rel. Town of South Kingstown v. Reilly, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court interpreted the Department of Health regu-
lations regarding chemical tests administered to those suspected of
driving under the influence. Under these regulations, in order to
validate the results of a chemical test, a second test must be given
no less than thirty minutes after the first. The court held that that
this thirty-minute interval between tests need only be measured in
minutes, rather than seconds. Furthermore, on the facts alleged
here, even if the police's failure to measure the thirty-minute inter-
val in seconds had been a violation of the testing regulations defen-
dant was still not entitled to a suppression order. The court
reaffirmed and extended its earlier holding that a defendant seek-
ing suppression of chemical test results cannot merely point to a
violation of the testing regulations; the defendant must also show
that the alleged violation affected the validity of the test results.
Because the defendant here had not demonstrated that the failure
to measure the thirty-minute interval in seconds rather than min-
24. See id. (citing Snyder, 692 A.2d at 706 (R.I. 1997)).
25. See id. (citing Snyder, 692 A.2d at 706 (R.I. 1997)).
26. See id.
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utes actually affected the validity of the results, the trial justice
should not have granted an order suppressing the test results.
Vicki J. Bejma
SURVEY SECTION
Criminal Law. Toole v. State, 748 A.2d 806 (R.I. 2000). In Toole
v. State, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that unless there is
an actual or potential conflict of interest at the time of trial, the
public defender (PD) is free to represent a defendant. The court
also held that mere tactical decisions, though ill-advised, do not by
themselves constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally,
the court must give a defendant the opportunity to establish, when
applying for post-conviction relief, that there are genuine issues of
material fact. The defendant has the burden of establishing that
there are such issues; if he fails to meet his burden, the trial justice
may dismiss the application without an evidentiary hearing.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
This is the third time the Rhode Island Supreme Court has
heard an appeal arising from the conviction of James Toole (Toole),
a former Pawtucket police officer, of five counts of child molesta-
tion on February 5, 1993, in Rhode Island Superior Court.' Toole
had been accused of the sexual molestation of his biological daugh-
ter.2 The daughter testified at trial that sexual activity was initi-
ated by her father nearly every day from the time she was
approximately four years old until she was seventeen and a half.3
Toole was convicted of three counts of first-degree sexual assault
upon a child under the age of thirteen and of two counts of first-
degree sexual assault by force and coercion. 4
The court sentenced Toole to five concurrent life sentences.5
Toole appealed, and the convictions were affirmed.6 Defendant
then applied for post-conviction relief, but the superior court de-
nied application without an evidentiary hearing.7 Toole appealed
this denial.8 The Rhode Island Supreme Court remanded back to
the superior court, holding that the trial court was required to give
Toole an opportunity to reply to the court's proposed dismissal of
his post-conviction application for relief.9 However, the trial jus-
1. See Toole v. State, 748 A.2d 806, 806 (R.I. 2000).
2. See State v. Toole, 640 A.2d 965, 968 (R.I. 1994).
3. See id.
4. See Toole, 748 A.2d at 807.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
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tice did not have to conduct an evidentiary hearing if, from Toole's
reply, the trial justice determined that no genuine issue of mate-
rial fact existed.' 0 Upon remand, the trial justice issued a second
memorandum and order that again denied Toole's application for
post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing." Again,
Toole appealed.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, Toole argued three points. First, Toole argued that
PD Richard Casparian had a conflict in representing Toole because
Toole was a witness for the prosecution in a case against another
PD client, Michael Richardson (Richardson).12 Toole had been a
Pawtucket police officer and had participated in the arrest of Rich-
ardson for murder and, ironically, child molestation. 13 The court
followed precedent set in Hughes v. State,14 which held that "the
PD may not represent multiple clients if the representation of one
client materially limits the representation of another, unless the
clients consent after consultation." 15 However, there must be an
actual or potential conflict at the time the PD represented the
client.16
Here, there was no actual or potential conflict at the time of
Toole's trial because the Richardson case had ended months before
with a plea bargain, and Toole was never even required to serve as
a witness in that case.' 7 "In such a situation no conflict should be
imputed to the PD."' 8
Second, Toole argued that the PD provided "ineffective assis-
tance of counsel in failing to call the victim's pediatrician as a wit-
ness and in failing to preserve certain issues through proper
objection at trial."19 In reviewing a claim for ineffective assistance
of counsel the court has stated that the benchmark issue is
whether "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning
10. See id.
11. See id. at 806.
12. See id. at 808.
13. See id. at 808.
14. 656 A.2d 971 (R.I. 1995).
15. Toole, 748 A.2d at 808 (quoting Hughes, 656 A.2d at 972).
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. Id. at 808-09 (citing People v. Trichilo, 230 A.2d 926 (N.Y. 1996)).
19. Id. at 809.
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of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as hav-
ing produced a just result."20 The court has also held that "the
burden is placed on the defendant to show that the trial counsel's
errors violated his or her Sixth Amendment guarantee to coun-
sel,"21 and that the deficient performance of counsel prejudiced the
defense. 22 The court has made clear, however, that "mere tactical
decisions, through ill-advised, do not by themselves constitute inef-
fective assistance of counsel." 23
One allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel concerned
the failure of the defense counsel to call the victim's pediatrician to
testify.24 The allegation failed because some of the sexually abu-
sive conduct would not have produced physical signs and the pedi-
atrician would not have been able to testify that, in his expert
opinion, no sexual abuse had occurred.25 As a result, testimony
from a pediatrician would not have been enough to change the ver-
dict because the prosecution introduced substantial evidence of
Toole's guilt at trial including statements made by Toole's son, and
incriminating admissions by Toole himself.26
Toole's second allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel
concerned counsel's failure to object at certain unspecified times.27
The court found that defense counsel's failure to object may have
reflected legitimate defense strategy, and such tactics do not
amount to constitutionally ineffective counsel. 28 Any error in not
raising these objections was harmless. 29
Third, the trial justice erred in not holding an evidentiary
hearing concerning counsel's alleged failure to provide effective
counsel.30 The court found that in light of Toole's failure to estab-
lish ineffective assistance of counsel he had failed to demonstrate
the existence of genuine issues of material fact that would warrant
an evidentiary hearing.31 A trial judge may dismiss an application
20. Id. (quoting Tarvis v. Moran, 551 A.2d 699, 700-01 (R.I. 1988)).
21. Id. (quoting Tarvis v. Moran, 551 A.2d 699, 700-01 (R.I. 1988)).
22. See id.
23. Id. (citing State v. D'Alo, 477 A.2d 89 (R.I. 1984)).
24. See id.
25. See id. at 810.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 811 (citing D'Alo, 477 A.2d at 97).
30. See id. at 810.
31. See id.
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for post-conviction relief whenever he finds no genuine issue of ma-
terial fact exists. 32 The burden then shifts to the defendant to
show that genuine issues of material fact were in dispute.33 Here,
Toole failed to articulate specifically the existence of such genuine
issues of material fact.3 4
CONCLUSION
In Toole v. State, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
unless there is an actual or potential conflict of interest at the time
of trial, the Public Defender is free to represent a defendant. The
court also held that mere tactical decisions, though ill-advised, do
not by themselves constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Fi-
nally, the court must give a defendant the opportunity to establish,
when applying for post-conviction relief, that there are genuine is-
sues of material fact. The defendant has the burden of establish-
ing that there are such issues; if he fails to meet his burden, the
trial justice may dismiss the application without an evidentiary
hearing.
Joseph Proietta
32. See id.
33. See id. at 810-11.
34. See id. at 811,
